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ABSTRACT
Mobile devices are ubiquitous in today’s digital world. While peo-
ple enjoy the convenience brought by mobile devices, it has been
proven that many mobile apps leak personal information with-
out user consent or even awareness. at can occur due to many
reasons, such as careless programming errors, intention of devel-
opers to collect private information, infection of innocent apps by
malware, etc. us, the research community has proposed many
methods and systems to detect privacy leakage and prevent such
detected leakage on mobile devices. is is a to do note at mar-
gin While it is obviously essential to evaluate the accuracy and
eectiveness of privacy protection systems, we are not aware of
any automated system that can benchmark performance of privacy
protection systems on Android devices. In this paper, we report
PPAndroid-Benchmarker, the rst system of this kind, which can
fairly benchmark any privacy protection systems dynamically (i.e.,
in run time) or statically. PPAndroid-Benchmarker has been re-
leased as an open-source tool and we believe that it will help the
research community, developers and even end users to analyze,
improve, and choose privacy protection systems on Android de-
vices. We applied PPAndroid-Benchmarker in dynamic mode to
165 Android apps with some privacy protection features, selected
from variant app markets and the research community, and showed
eectiveness of the tool. We also illustrate two components of
PPAndroid-Benchmarker on the design level, which are Automatic
Test Apps Generator for benchmarking static analysis based tools
and Recongurability Engine that allows any instance of PPAndroid-
Benchmarker to be recongured including but not limited to adding
and removing information sources and sinks. Furthermore, we give
some insights about current status of mobile privacy protection
and prevention in app markets based upon our analysis.
KEYWORDS
Android, mobile apps, privacy leakages, privacy protection, bench-
marking, performance evaluation, static analysis, dynamic analysis
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices’ usage has increased rapidly over the recent years.
ewide range of mobile devices’ possession has been accompanied
by the rise of mobile apps e.g. Google Play is now oering over 3
million apps as the time of this writing [1]. Mobile users can enjoy
a variety of apps, which provide appropriate services and aractive
features by making use of smart devices’ capabilities.
Undoubtedly, the advance in mobile technologies opens the door
for new privacy issues and concerns. e consequences of privacy
violations on individuals have led research and industry to focus
heavily on user privacy. In some cases, malicious identities may
exploit users’ data to steal or uncover personal information about
them. In some other cases, intruders may misuse collected sensitive
data to nancially or socially harm users. Moreover, data can be
used by companies to identify personal information about users
without their consent. Consequently, the research community has
proposed many solutions to overcome privacy and security obsta-
cles. Many protection mechanisms and detective approaches have
been oered to detect and prevent mobile privacy leakages.
However, existing solutions have limitations. For instance, static
analysis basedmethodsmostly require access to source code. On the
other hand, dynamic analysis based approaches are time-consuming
and normally cannot cover all possible privacy leakages [10]. An-
other common limitation is that many of these tools use a limited
and static list of information sources, leaving other sources uncov-
ered.
For each new privacy protection solution, there is always a prob-
lem of how to evaluate its performance against existing solutions.
Similarly, given a number of candidate solutions, a user has the
need to know which solution is the best for her specic needs. For
researchers, a proper benchmarking system is also desired so that
insights about how to improve exist solutions can be gained and
the performance of any new solution can be properly evaluated.
While such benchmarking systems are very important, surprisingly,
we could not nd any such systems in the research or commercial
worlds, not mentioning open-source tools. Instead, currently re-
searchers and developers either depend on bespoke performance
evaluation apps or collections of test apps to conduct such bench-
marking tasks (e.g. DroidBench [2, 23]).
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In this paper, we present PPAndroid-Benchmarker, a system
for benchmarking mobile privacy protection systems on Android
devices, which to our best knowledge is the rst of this kind.
PPAndroid-Benchmarker is designed to be oblivious to details of
mobile privacy protection systems, and can detect performance
of combined mobile privacy protection apps in run time – this is
why we use the term “systems” rather than “apps”. It is eectively
a system 1) simulating dierent kinds of tester-congurable pri-
vacy leakage activities; 2) capturing what leakage aempts were
successful; 3) supporting a high level of automation for the whole
benchmarking life-cycle; and 4) providing a good user interface for
testers to congure benchmarking tasks. Moreover, this paper also
highlights two additional components of PPAndroid-Benchmarker
at the design level (which have not been implemented in our proto-
type): 1) an Automatic Test Apps Generator for benchmarking static
analysis based privacy protection systems; and 2) a Recongurabil-
ity Engine allowing PPAndroid-Benchmarker to be recongured
such as adding and removing information sources and sinks. Al-
though we implemented a prototype system for Android OS only,
the framework is generic enough to be applied to other mobile oper-
ating systems such as iOS. We tested PPAndroid-Benchmarker with
165 selected Android privacy protection apps, and report our nd-
ings and some insights about current status and future directions
of mobile privacy protection and prevention tools.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
related work. e design of our system is described in Section III.
Section IV presents the experimental set-up we followed and Sec-
tion V illustrates the results and analysis. Section VI discusses the
implications of the ndings and some limitations. Lastly, Section VII
concludes the paper and illustrates some future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
is section is divided into two subsections, mobile privacy pro-
tection techniques and mobile privacy benchmarking systems. In
the former subsection, several privacy protection approaches are
presented for the purpose of understanding how privacy protec-
tion systems work. e laer subsection illustrates a few similar
systems and related works from research.
2.1 Application Analysis Based Approaches
e research community has proposed various techniques of mobile
application analysis many of which are based on static, dynamic
and hybrid analysis of computer programs.
In static analysis based approaches, the analysis is carried out
statically (i.e., without running the app) with (source code anal-
ysis) or without source code (binary code analysis). Almost all
mobile detection tools that follow this approach retrieve the target
app’s source code using a decompiler, and rely on its precision. For
instance, ScanDal [15] proposed by Kim et al. is an example of
the static analysis category, and there are many others [13, 27].
ScanDal implements a static analysis to detect data leakages by con-
verting a given app package from Dalvik byte-code to a pre-dened
intermediate language. Using abstract interpretations, suspicious
ows can be detected. Kim et al. analyzed 90 free apps, and they
found 11 of them leak private data. ey reported many location
leakages to remote ad servers, namely AdMob and AdSenseSpec.
Besides location data, many apps were found to leak IMEI to their
app servers.
On the other hand, dynamic analysis is based on observing dy-
namic behaviors of the target app in run time. By performing
dierent kinds of dynamic analysis techniques such as data ow
analysis (DFA) in mobile platforms, dynamic tools monitor sensitive
data sources and detect data leaks once the target app is executed.
TaintDroid [7] is one of the most well-known tools in this category.
Many other tools are built on top of TaintDroid by adding new
features, such as MockDroid [4], TISSA [28] and AppFence [14].
TaintDroid, applies a specic dynamic analysis technique called
taint tracking to detect potential data leaks. Sensitive information
sources are identied and tainted. Using DFA, TaintDroid monitors
how apps handle tainted information and notify the user if sensitive
data is leaked outside the device. One problem of TaintDroid and
some other dynamic analysis based mobile privacy protection tools
is that it requires changes to mobile operating systems, which may
not be possible or dicult in some applications. To overcome this
problem, Rastogi et al. proposed Uranine [21], a system for instru-
menting existing apps so that taint tracking can be done without
changes to mobile operating systems.
In hybrid analysis methods, static and dynamic analysis tech-
niques are combined to improve privacy leakage detection [18]. For
instance, SmartDroid [26] combines static and dynamic analysis
in a two-level process. At the rst level, it utilizes a static path
selector to identify activity switch paths through analyzing activity
and function call graphs. At the second level, SmartDroid imple-
ments a dynamic analysis to traverse each UI element and explore
the UI interaction paths towards sensitive APIs.
In addition to code analysis and dynamic app behavior monitor-
ing, the app package manifest le is another important source of
information for inferring potential privacy problems in mobile apps.
e app package manifest le contains permission labels and some
other useful information. Mobile platforms apply a permission
framework that allows users to control mobile apps’ access to sensi-
tive information and resources such as geo-locations and help them
to make proper decisions prior to app installation. Researchers
have proposed many methods of identifying suspicious apps by
analyzing permissions they request. Enck et al. proposed Kirin, a
system that can detect potentially malicious apps by matching some
pre-dened security rules with information in the package manifest
le [8]. A similar system called Stowaway was proposed by Felt et
al. [11], which identies malicious apps based on over-privileges.
ey analyzed 956 apps from Google Play where they found that
most common unnecessarily requested permissions are accessing
the Internet and reading phone state.
In another work [12], Gates et al. proposed a permission analysis
based approach to producing risk signals and risk scores for apps
to help users identify risky apps. Zhang et al. presented VetDroid
[25] which falls in the same category. It is a tool that reconstructs
sensitive apps behaviors from a permission use perspective. It
applies a dynamic analysis approach and presents a systematic
framework in constructing permission use behaviours.
Yet another way of capturing suspicious behaviors is by moni-
toring and analyzing network trac associated with an app. For in-
stance, AntMonitor [16] is a trac monitoring system for passive
monitoring, collection, and analysis of network trac of Android
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devices. Using a VPN service and a special interface, AntMonitor
can analyze all outgoing trac from apps to hosts, as well as in-
coming packets from hosts. AntClient, a component of AntMonitor
running from the user’s device, lets the user know if installed apps
are leaking her personally identiable information. AGRIGENTO
[6] is another example falling in this category. is system is mainly
designed to detect privacy violations using a black-box dierential
analysis technique. By creating a network behavior baseline of
each app and modifying information sources, AGRIGENTO can
capture privacy leaks (i.e., deviations from the baseline behavior)
in the resulting network trac.
Some researchers also paid aention to justiable sensitive infor-
mation transmission as part of an app’s functionality. For instance,
Chen and Zhu proposed DroidJust [5], an automated technique
that can dierentiate justiable sensitive information transmission
and privacy leakage by malicious apps. In [9], Fan et al. proposed
four metrics (possibility, severity, crypticity, and manipulability) to
quantitatively analyze privacy leak behaviour. e authors showed
the eectiveness of the proposed metrics in revealing apps’ charac-
teristics in several aspects.
2.2 Mobile Privacy Benchmarking Systems
In order to help users decide what tools to use and how to use them,
privacy protection tools need to be carefully validated and their
performance compared with each other. Surprisingly, while there is
a lot of work on developing mobile privacy protection tools, there
is very lile work on benchmarking mobile privacy protection
tools. is subsection focuses on DroidBench, the closest work
comparing to the system we propose in this paper. In addition, we
also introduce some other loosely related work.
DroidBench [2] is a collection of dierent Android apps from
various categories that deliberately leak many types of data. Addi-
tionally, some apps without data leakages are also included to allow
detection of false positives. DroidBench tests if Android privacy
protection tools could detect such privacy leaks when they occur
or the privacy-leaking apps before any leakage aempts take place.
Stanford SecuriBench [19] is very similar to DroidBench but
include Java web-based applications rather than Android apps. It
consists of eight open-sourceWeb-based Java applications that have
intentional security aws. ey purposely suer from a number of
vulnerabilities, including SQL injections, cross-site scripting, HTTP
spliing and path traversal aacks. is tool is meant to serve
as test cases for researchers and practitioners to study solutions
against such applications with security aws.
ere have been some eorts in benchmarking ad hoc privacy
protection tools or techniques onmobile platforms. InAnti-TaintDroid
(also called ScrubDroid) [22] Sarwar et al. investigated the limita-
tions of TaintDroid in tracking sensitive information leaks on An-
droid mobile devices. Multiple aacks on TaintDroid were demon-
strated using a number of generic classes of anti-taint methods.
3 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
is section illustrates the design and some implementation details
of the proposed benchmarking system.
3.1 Overall Design
emain purpose of PPAndroid-Benchmarker is to evaluate privacy
leakage detection applications in an automated manner. As stated
earlier, the Android platform is targeted in this work. PPAndroid-
Benchmarker is composed of three basic components, the bench-
marker app, the drop-in server and the PC-based mobile device
manager (MDM). Figure 1 shows the architecture of PPAndroid-
Benchmarker. Firstly, the benchmarker is programmed to simulate
leakages of dierent types of private information. It has a prole
creator that allows the user to dene dierent benchmarking tasks.
Secondly, the drop-in server is used to receive leaked information
from the benchmarker. Lastly, the MDM handles automatic instal-
lation and uninstallation of tested apps during the benchmarking
process.
 
Drop-in Server
Android Testing 
Benchmark
PC-based 
Android Device 
Manager
Storage of Leaked 
Information
Figure 1: PPAndroid-Benchmarker’s overall design.
3.2 PPAndroid-Benchmarker Components
Figure 2 shows how PPAndroid-Benchmarker’s dierent compo-
nents interact with each other as data ows between them, where
the user is also shown as a “component” as his/her interactions
with several components are needed. In the following, we explain
the three key components with greater details.
e Prole Creator allows a user (who wants to tests some
privacy protection apps) to create the actual benchmarking task
(i.e., a benchmarking prole). Any proles created can be stored in
a prole database so that they can be reused in future. e prole
database can also retrieve app-related information from an Apps
Repository which will also work with theMDM (to be explained
below). e Prole Creator interacts with the user to collect infor-
mation about a benchmarking prole and feed the created prole
to the Benchmarker App for execution. e proles are stored
as XML les to make them accessible from other components and
external applications more easily. e Prole Creator can be made
part of the Benchmarker App or be implemented as a PC-based
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Figure 2: PPAndroid-Benchmarker’s components and data
ow map.
application which communicate with the Benchamarker App via
USB or a wireless channel.
e Benchmarker App is the core of PPAndroid-Benchmarker
and its main purpose is to simulate leakages of dierent types of
private information. It is programmed to collect a variety of private
information from the hosting mobile device. us, this app needs
to be granted with all required permissions in order to access all
data sources. is is not an issue as the benchmarker is used for
testing purposes only, and can run on a dedicated testing device
or within an emulator. e Benchmarker App is programmed to
leak information to aDrop-in Server, which is a web server set up
to simulate an aacker’s information collection server. e Drop-
in Server is designed to collect all needed information to create
results of each benchmarking prole, which are stored in aResults
Database for further (o-line) analysis. e Benchmarker App is
connected to the MDM in order to facilitate the automation of the
benchmarking process.
Furthermore, the Benchmarker App is facilitated with many anti-
tainting tricks. Many designed dynamic analysis tools apply taint
tracking technique, e.g., TaintDroid, MockDroid, AppFence and
many others. erefore, we added several tricks, which are con-
structed to bypass dynamic taint tracking. In our current implemen-
tation, we include the following tricks reported in Anti-TaintDroid
[22], which were veried to be still valid for the Android and Taint-
Droid versions we tested.
• simple encoding trick
• shell command trick
• le+shell hybrid trick
• time keeper trick
• count-to-X trick
• le length trick
• clipboard trick
• exception/error trick
• remote control trick
• le last modied trick
e Mobile Device Management (MDM) is a PC-based An-
droid device manager handling automatic installation and unin-
stallation of each tested privacy protection app during the testing
process. We implemented the MDM to communicate with the
Benchmarker App via a TCP port, although other communication
channels can also be used. When it receives an app download
link, it downloads it and installs it to the mobile device using ADB
(Android Device Bridge). Aer the benchmarking process ends at
the Benchmarker App’s side, the MDM will receive a request of
uninstalling the tested app.
Drop-in Server: In order to simulate the complete information
leakage process, a sink is required to allow information to go out
of the mobile device. In PPAndroid-Benchmarker, the Internet
connection is used as the sink. To simulate the case of information
leaked through the Internet, we need to set up a server that receives
leaked information. A number of server-side scripts (wrien in
PHP in our implementation) are used to handle received leakage
information, some are used to receive leaked les, and some others
to create the results as XML les.
We implemented a prototype of PPAndroid-Benchmarker in-
cluding all the above components. At the time of this writing, our
prototype supports the following information sources:
• Device IDs: IMEI, IMSI, Android ID
• Personal data: SMS messages, contacts, call logs and
browsing history
• Sensor data: camera, microphone, accelerometer axes
data, last known geolocation by GPS device or the ISP
(Internet service provider)
• Files on the mobile device’s external memory storage
e above list is not supposed to be complete, but used as a rep-
resentative start of our prototype system. Adding more sources
is a maer of improving the tool itself. To simplify our prototype
system, we do not apply any advanced processing of information
leaked (e.g. encryption and steganography) other than some tricks
specially added to circumvent taint tracking techniques. Adding
more advanced information processing operations to information
leaked will not be dicult, but require a proper interface to allow
easy reconguration (see below).
Our design also considers two other major conceptual compo-
nents, the Automatic Test Apps Generator and the Recong-
urability Engine, which have not been implemented in our cur-
rent prototype system yet but will be added in future versions of
PPAndroid-Benchmarker prototype.
3.3 Automatic Test Apps Generator
PPAndroid-Benchmarker is designed to benchmark privacy pro-
tection apps more in a dynamic way. To support benchmarking
of static analysis tools, an automatic Test Apps Generator can
be developed to allow generation of apps with dierent privacy
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leakage capabilities. e Test Apps Generator will take the source
code of the Benchmarker App as the source and the user’s descrip-
tions of the test apps wanted, and generate a number of apps with
requested privacy leakage capabilities. e process of generating
test apps can contain random factors so that a large number of test
apps can be generated, which will produce much more test cases
for static analysis based tools than other solutions can provide. e
generated apps (in the form of apk les) can be used to benchmark
any static analysis based privacy protection systems. is compo-
nent can be achieved in several ways such as embedding a compiler
that can automatically convert the source code of the Benchmarker
App into a subset representing the needed privacy leakage prole
and then compile the resulting source code to a mobile app. e
compiler may be implemented as part of the MDM as well.
3.4 Recongurability Engine
Any instance of PPAndroid-Benchmarker can only cover a limited
number of sources and sinks and limited seings for benchmarking
proles. To allow extension of supported features and recongura-
tion of the system (including removing some unwanted features), a
Recongurability Engine can also be developed.
A major part of the Recongurability Engine is addition and
removal of sources and sinks. is can be achieved by dening
a dynamic list of sources and sinks for PPAndroid-Benchmarker
to process. e dynamic list needs to support both descriptions
of sources and sinks and also code for accessing the sources and
sinks. One way of supporting such a dynamic list is to have an XML
le for the sources and another one for the sink, and the binary
code for accessing each source and sink is provided in the form
of an executable plug-in following a dened API. Another way of
achieving this is to provide source code of new sources and sinks
directly with description les, and a compiler is used to re-compile
the whole system into a new instance of PPAndroid-Benchmarker.
Another part of the Recongurability Engine is changing how
the system behaves e.g. how to automatically congure some pri-
vacy protection apps requiring human intervention, which can
be achieved by dening other conguration les or APIs so that
dierent types of plug-ins can be added.
Another major part of the Recongurability Engine is to add
and recongure more information processing operations and tricks
against static and dynamic analysis techniques. Our prototype has
included a number of tricks mainly for testing TaintDroid. Adding
more will require a dierent type of API and plug-in system so that
any operation can be added between any pair of source and sink,
which will need to work along with the API/plug-in systems for
sources and sinks.
3.5 Interaction between Components
e interactions between dierent components can be explained
by how a typical benchmarking task looks like. At the beginning,
the user will ll a test prole to tell the benchmarker about details
of the test. It will include information such as types of leaked data,
mobile device specications, privacy apps to be tested and others.
e proles are wrien in XML as stated. e prole creator keeps
XML les in the Proles Database in order to be used for analysis.
en the Benchmarker App starts communicating with the MDM
to request installing each tested app. e MDM searches for the
required app and installs it. MDM keeps records of installed apps
in the Apps Repository for future use. Once the Benchmarker App
receives a signal of starting the test, it will initiate leakage aempts
to the Drop-in Server. e laer keeps the results as XML proles
in the Results Database.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, the method we followed to set up the experiment is
explained. It starts with describing how tested apps were collected,
followed by how special apps were handled. Lastly, an explanation
of variant seings and implementation is provided.
4.1 Selection of Privacy Protection Apps
e rst step of the experiment was to identify and collect An-
droid apps with some real-time privacy protection features. ese
tools were collected from variant sources. Many of them were
gathered from Google Play store as it is the main source for An-
droid apps. e following steps were taken to collect the apps.
Firstly, Google’s search engine was used to look for related privacy
apps. Many keywords were used in this step. For example, we
used “privacy”, “security”, “private”, “protection”, “leak”, “dynamic
analysis”, “static analysis”, “leakages” and several others. Secondly,
some major third-party Android markets have been explored such
as Amazon Appstore, GetJar, Slide ME, F-Droid, Samsung Galaxy
Apps, AppsLib, Mobogenie and a few others. irdly, many related
apps have been collected from cyber security product vendors and
service providers. e list of these vendors were taken from AV-
Comparatives website [3]. ere are around 50 mobile security
companies like AVG, AegisLab, Bitdefender, etc. Lastly, some data
leakage protection and Android forensics tools are included such
as TaintDroid, NowSecure forensic tool [20], PrivacyProtecter app
reported in [17]. We wanted to test all privacy protection apps we
found but not all of them are available or provide real-time protec-
tion. At the time of this writing, in total 165 privacy protection apps
have been collected and tested. According to the sources, these
tools can be categorized as follows:
• Apps dedicated for privacy protection (from Google Play),
• security appswith privacy protection features (fromGoogle
Play),
• apps from third-party markets,
• security vendors’ apps (those not covered in the above
categories),
• privacy related apps developed by researchers.
Functionally speaking, those tools can be categorized into three
dierent groups:
(1) apps that try to detect privacy violations at installation
time,
(2) apps that detect privacy violations based on blocking access
to sensitive information sources,
(3) real-time dynamic monitoring tools requiring changes to
the Android system.
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4.2 Testing Procedure and Settings
In our experiment, the testing procedure covers three dierent
scenarios: fully automated testing without user intervention, semi-
automated testing with user intervention, and testing access-related
analysis apps. For the fully automated scenario, the tester (as a
user) is involved to select target apps for testing and dene the
benchmarking tasks only. For the semi-automated scenario, the
tester is also involved in the process of installing process because
some apps require manual conguration before they can run prop-
erly. For the last scenario, the Benchmarker App will aempt to
access private sources rst. en, if the access is granted, the app
will proceed with the actual leakage.
PPAndroid-Benchmarker has been equipped with some options
to increase the conguration power. For instance, the user can
set time-outs for the evaluation test. Moreover, the user can set
wait times between data acquisition by the benchmarker and data
leaking aempts.
e architecture of PPAndroid-Benchmarker is intended to work
in an automated manner as much as possible including automati-
cally downloading and installing a target app. However, download
links of some apps cannot be automatically determined, so the
apk les must be provided manually by the user Moreover, some
apps are marked for manual conguration and initialization. For
instance, some apps require manual registration, accepting terms or
connecting to the cloud. To ensure all target apps were tested with
the most appropriate conguration seings, we tested seings with
and without user intervention manually and then labelled each app
with the best seing accordingly.
While testing apps which require Root access, we noticed that
there is a need of dierent seings. In this case, PPAndroid-Benchmarker
is programmed to also record if access to each target data source is
blocked. at allows PPAndroid-Benchmarker to know if a recorded
failure of a privacy leakage aempt was blocked at the access level
or at a later stage.
Most apps can be tested with PPAndroid-Benchmarker with-
out a special treatment. However, there are a few tools that must
be tested using a dierent procedure or special seings. For ex-
ample, TaintDroid does not work as a stand-alone application. It
involves building a custom-built operating system on the tested
device/emulator. us, a customized version of Android was built
to test TaintDroid against our system in an emulator. Accordingly,
we tested Anti-TaintDroid (ScrubDroid) in the same environment,
too.
In our experiment, we chose not to test apps based on trac
analysis. Testing such apps requires some signicant changes to
the architecture and procedures of PPAndroid-Benchmarker, and
we leave this as our future work.
4.3 Special Benchmarking Proles
In this subsection, we discuss some special benchmarking proles
we used in our experiment.
Baseline Benchmarking Prole: e Android system itself
may already has some privacy protection mechanism so that some
privacy leakage aempts can be detected and blocked at the oper-
ating system level. In our experiment, we always ran a baseline
prole without any third-party privacy protection app rst. When
each privacy protection app was tested, only those new successes in
detecting privacy leakages were counted. For the Android version
we ran our experiment, none of the privacy leakage aempt was
detected by the Android system, but this may change in future
versions.
Probing Phase: As mentioned above, some apps may require
user intervention. A probing phase was therefore added to test
if an app behaves dierently with and without user intervention.
Figure 3 shows how this phase was conducted.
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Figure 3: PPAndroid-Benchmarker in probing phase.
Access-Based Apps: Some apps block privacy leakages by
blocking access to sensitive information sources. erefore, a spe-
cial benchmarking task is added to test if a privacy leakage aempt
is blocked at the source access level or aerwards. e Benchmarker
App will access each sources in the benchmarking prole and check
if there is a response from the tested app, and if the access goes
through it will proceed with the actual leaking aempt.
5 RESULTS & ANALYSIS
is section presents the analysis results gathered from testing
collected apps and tools. We report the results for the three func-
tional categories of privacy protection apps, respectively, since the
behaviors of apps in each category are similar.
5.1 Probing Phase Results
During the study, we noticed that some apps need to be congured
before using to ensure all included privacy protection means and
seings are enabled. A small experiment was conducted for nine
apps, selected from distinct categories. Seven out of nine asked
for user input in variant ways. For example, some asked the user
to accept terms, to slide a few ad pages, to register on-line or to
wait for conguration. We also calculated the time spent to set up
each app aer installation. Table 3 shows the ndings of this small
pilot study. As a consequence, the actual benchmarking tasks were
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Table 1: Testing Installation-Time Privacy Apps
Apps Category Sensitive Information Source
Device IDs Accelerometer Contacts Location SMS Files Web History Call Log Camera
Installation-time apps F F F F F F F F F
‘F’ means the tested app failed in detecting the leakage aempt.
Table 2: Testing Privacy Apps that Require Root Access
App Name Vendor/Developer
Sensitive Information Source
Device IDs Accelerometer Contacts Loc. SMS Files Web Call Camera
data details History Logs
SECUREit Lenovo F F B B B F B B F
X Privacy Marcel Bokhorst B+ F B B B F B B B
LBE Privacy Guard Lamian B F B B B F F B B
360 Mobile Safe Qihoo 360 B F B B B F F B B
PrivacyProtecter Li et al. B F F F F F F F B
‘F’ means the tested app failed in detecting the leakage aempt.
‘B’ indicates that the privacy system blocked access to the information source.
‘B+’ refers that the privacy system is able to go beyond blocking access via faking the leaked information.
conducted in two approaches depending on if user intervention
is needed: fully automated without user intervention and semi-
automated with user intervention.
Table 3: Probing Apps Requirement of User-Intervention
App Set-up Interac- Type
No. time in tion of interaction
seconds required
1 16.1 Yes Accept terms/ Connect to cloud
2 26.5 Yes Accept policy/ Congurations
3 8.5 No -
4 22.5 Yes Slide some ads/ Congurations
5 8.8 Yes Accept policy/ Congurations
6 13.0 Yes Accept terms/ Upgrade oer
7 76.3 Yes Accept terms/ Set a code/ Register
8 57.4 Yes Click start/ Seing/ Slide ads
9 18.0 No -
5.2 Benchmarking Results
Static analysis based apps: A majority of the mobile privacy pro-
tecting applications collected from dierent app markets belong to
the rst category. Apps in this group are only capable of inspecting
privacy-related features of an app at installation time. ey either
apply a permission analysis, statically analyze installed apps or
upload examined app to a sandbox to test it dynamically. Some
tools notify the user of reported malicious apps if installed. Never-
theless, none of them reported the Benchmarker App of PPAndroid-
Benchmarker as a malicious app. erefore, all tested apps did
not block or detect any of the leaking aempts. Table 1 claries
that where ‘F’ indicates the failure of tested apps to detect privacy
violation. e results are expected and demonstrated PPAndroid-
Benchmarker worked as designed.
In this group, approximately %75 of the apps were tested semi-
automatically with user intervention and the others tested fully
automatically.
Privacy apps requiring Root access: e second category
covers apps that block access to dened sensitive data sources on
mobile devices. All apps in this group require the Root access in or-
der to reject other apps’ requests of accessing sensitive information
sources. In our testing, ve commercial apps were found to provide
such a functionality: SECUREit, X Privacy, Pdroid Privacy Protection,
LBE privacy guard and 360 Mobile Safe. e last two apps are only
available in Chinese. One research app developed by Li et al. [17]
also falls into this category.
Table 2 shows the result of testing apps in this category. ose
apps are dierent in terms of how much they protect the user. As
illustrated, each app has its own xed list of predened private
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Table 4: Testing TaintDroid against PPAndroid-Benchmarker
Anti-Taint Sensitive Information Source
Trick Device IDs Accelerometer Contacts Location SMS Files Web History Call Log Camera
None S S S S S F S F S
simple encoding F F F F F F F F -
shell command F F F F F F F F -
le+shell hybrid F F F F F F F F -
time keeper F F F F F F F F -
count-to-X F F F F F F F F -
le length F F F F F F F F -
clipboard F F F F F F F F -
exception/error F F F F F F F F -
remote control F F F F F F F F -
le last modied F F F F F F F F -
direct buer S S S S S F S F -
lookup table S S S S S F S F -
‘F’ means the tested app failed in detecting the leakage aempt.
‘S’ means the tested app succeeded in detecting the leakage aempt.
‘-’ anti-taint tricks cannot be applied to camera photos, as they are designed to process strings only.
information sources. e table shows how each app responded
to privacy leaks of variant sources. ‘F’ indicates that the app did
not react against that leakage, where ‘B’ means the aempt was
blocked. X Privacy clearly is more diverse than others in covering
many sensitive sources. It is also capable of faking the mobile device
identier IMEI (represented as ‘B+’ in Table 2). is app is the only
one in this group able of providing an option beyond blocking
aempts. Hence, X Privacy gives three options when the IMEI is
being accessed: block, fake, and allow. All the apps in this group
were tested in the semi-automated with user interaction mode on a
rooted device. e reason is that they need to be granted with root
access to function. Additionally, most of them require the user to
set up the app and interact with some interfaces before they are
ready.
Real-time privacymonitoring apps: e last category covers
only a few apps developed by researchers. For this category we
tested TaintDroid since it is the basis of many other solutions.
Table 4 illustrates the result of benchmarking TaintDroid with our
system. It shows that TaintDroid succeeded in detecting privacy
leakages in real time, as ‘S’ shows in the table, for its predened
list of sensitive information sources. Each time we tried to leak a
piece of sensitive information, TaintDroid triggered a notication
showing the tainted tracked data alongside with the leaking app
and some other details. Some information sources, notably ‘les’,
‘call log’ and ‘camera’, are not included in TaintDroid’s list, so the
privacy leakage aempts were not detected. When the information
leakage was aempted using anti-tainting tricks, most of leakage
aempts were not detected, especially for the ‘direct buer’ and
‘lookup table’ tricks.
TaintDroid in this work was tested in a customized emulator
since it requires a modied version of Android operating system to
run. We tested TaintDroid in a fully automatically manner since
no user intervention is required in the benchmarking process.
6 DISCUSSIONS
In brief, our experiments proved that PPAndroid-Benchmarker is
eciently and correctly working as designed. e overall results
from the benchmarking experiment can be summarized as follows:
static analysis based apps tested all failed to detect any real-time
leakage aempts, privacy apps that require Root access could block
access to some sensitive information sources, and TaintDroid (rep-
resenting dynamic analysis based methods) could detect most of
the leakage aempts except for three information sources tested
but it failed when most anti-tainting tricks were applied.
As a general observation, the more “intrusive” a privacy protec-
tion tool is, the more powerful it can do to detect and prevent pri-
vacy leakage aempts. By “intrusive” we mean how much changes
a tool requires from the operating system, ranging from the most
intrusive to the least: rebuilding the operating system, requesting
Root access to the operating system, hooking into the operating
system for checking new apps at the installation time. However,
even for the most intrusive tool, TaintDroid, there are still privacy
leakages that cannot be detected. is implies that the best ap-
proach is for the operating system itself to provide native support
on privacy leakage detection and prevention, so that the intrusive-
ness will not be an issue any more. If that happens, PPAndroid-
Benchmarker will still be able to benchmark the built-in privacy
protection mechanism since it simple simulates what malicious
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apps are doing. As a maer of fact, in our current implementa-
tion, a baseline benchmarking prole is always run without any
third-party privacy protection apps so that we know what privacy
leakage aempts can be detected by the Android system itself.
Some could argue, why PPAndroid-Benchmarker does not give
a numeric or categorical rating for tested apps. Having a way of
rating privacy protection mobile apps in terms of their general
performance can be very useful for end users, and is a topic for our
future research. A possible way of giving scores or ratings through
our system is to count how many sensitive sources are protected
by the tested tool, but some issues need to be carefully considered.
First, not all sensitive information leakages are considered privacy
violation [24]. Some sensitive information is transmied out of
the device for the sake of providing beer services for the user.
For instance, collecting users’ precise location can help an app
give more personalized and contextualized recommendations, and
collecting some user details help mobile app vendors to provide
extra functionalities and more personalized services. Another issue
is that it can be very challenging to cover all means of collecting
sensitive information sources from the mobile device, so any rat-
ings based on a limited coverage can be inaccurate or biased. In
addition, it is not trivial to give a single rating for so many dierent
information sources and ways to leak information. It may be bene-
cial to produce multiple ratings representing dierent aspects of
the privacy protection level. For each rating, there is also issues
around how to aggregate results of all covered information sources
and sinks together, which is not trivial, either. erefore, rating
mobile privacy protection apps could be a very complicated task,
and requires further work beyond this paper’s scope.
One of the key design goals of the presented work is to increase
the level of automation to streamline the benchmarking processes.
However, since Google Play’s Terms of Services does not allow
automated download of mobile apps, that feature cannot be fully
achieved for our prototype. e system has to run in away such that
the tester is asked to provide the apk le of the tested app. Never-
theless, PPAndroid-Benchmarker currently mitigates this problem
by building an Apps Repository so that known apps can be re-
trieved directly from the database without any user intervention.
Note that this limitation is not a technical issue but a legal one. If
PPAndroid-Benchmarker is adopted by Google, this issue will go
away naturally.
As we mentioned before, due to the need to set up and congure
initial seings, it is not possible to fully automate the benchmarking
process without any human intervention. However, given enough
information about what kinds of human interventions are needed,
such interventions can be avoided by adding needed human in-
teractions into the Apps Repository and then using some system
services to emulate the actions done by human users. For instance,
some system services for accessibility purposes have provided ways
to automate clicks of buons on the user interface, which may be
incorporated in further versions of PPAndroid-Benchmarker.
To allow further development and validation of PPAndroid-
Benchmarker by the wider research community, we decided to
release our current implementation as an open-source tool at hps:
//github.com/SaeedAlqahtani/PPAndroid-Benchmarker. As men-
tioned before, we plan to add some new components and APIs into
the current implementation. We also welcome other researchers
and developers to contribute to PPAndroid-Benchmarker, by con-
ducting more tests, adding new add-ons to it and porting it to other
mobile operating systems.
7 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we present PPAndroid-Benchmarker, a benchmark-
ing system for evaluating performance of mobile privacy protec-
tion apps. is system allows to benchmark privacy protection
apps designed for the Android platform. To the best of our knowl-
edge, PPAndroid-Benchmarker is the rst of its kind. We tested
PPAndroid-Benchmarker on 165 privacy protection apps belonging
to three dierent functional categories to demonstrate PPAndroid-
Benchmarker’s eectiveness in evaluating their performance in
detecting privacy leakage aempts. We believe that the experiment
we conducted is also the rst of the kind as many previous eorts
are about benchmarking privacy risks of normal apps rather than
privacy protection apps. e results showed that real-time dynamic
monitoring tools like TaintDroid is the best approach, which is
not a surprise since such tools require the most changes to the
underlying operating system.
For future work, there are a number of improvements we can
make on PPAndroid-Benchmarker. e most important compo-
nents to add to our prototype are the Test Apps Generator and the
Recongurability Engine discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4. Adding
these two components is not technically dicult, although we will
need to decide carefully how to make them more usable to end
users of PPAndroid-Benchmarker. Another interesting feature to
add is to incorporate the system with an O-line Analyzer. is
component can be designed to collect both testing proles and
benchmarking results with the aim of producing more visualized
results to facilitate understanding of tested privacy protection apps
and comparing their performance. It can also produce one or more
ratings to reect the level of privacy protection of each tested app.
Furthermore, another future work is to add a benchmarking prole
for dynamic behaviour apps. Some privacy protection apps have
dynamic behaviors. ere are some privacy protection apps con-
nected to a cloud and update their data every while. Other apps
may have an intelligent way of adapting their behaviors, e.g. it
may use machine learning techniques and improve its responses to
privacy leakage aempts of malicious apps. To properly benchmark
such apps, PPAndroid-Benchmarker need to run the benchmarking
task for a signicantly long period of time and capture a number of
snapshots of the tested app’s behavior, and then see if some changes
can be observed.
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